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Abstract
Gricean intentionalists hold that what a speaker says and means by a linguistic
utterance is determined by the speaker’s communicative intention. On this view,
one cannot really say anything without meaning it as well. Conventionalists
argue, however, that malapropisms provide powerful counterexamples to this
claim. I present two arguments against the conventionalist and sketch a new
Gricean theory of speech errors, called the misarticulation theory. On this view
malapropisms are understood as a special case of mispronunciation. I argue that
the Gricean theory is supported by empirical work in phonetics and phonology
and, also, that conventionalism inevitably fails to do this work justice. I conclude,
from this, that the conventionalist fails to show that malapropisms constitute a
counterexample to a Gricean theory.
1 Introduction
What should Gricean intentionalists say about malapropisms or speech errors more
generally? Here, I am concerned with a group of ‘Griceans’ who share at least one
core commitment.
No saying without meaning
If speaker S says that p by uttering sentence σ in language L on some occasion,
∗(B) elmar.geir@gmail.com
∗First, I want to thank Michael Devitt, Stephen Neale and Stephen Schier, who got me thinking
about these issues in a seminar at NYU in spring 2013. The paper has also benetted from discus-
sion, suggestions, and comments from Michael Devitt, Daniel Harris, Hrafn Ásgeirsson, Aðalsteinn
Hákonarson, Matt Moss, Thomas Hodgson, Deirdre Wilson, Robert Stainton, and Nanna Teitsdóttir.
Finally, many thanks to the reviewers for this journal for all their helpful and incisive comments.
Malapropism: Saying without meaning? 2
(i) p must be constitutively determined by S’s speaker meaning on that occasion
and, (ii) p must be compatible with the abstract linguistic meaning of σ in L.
No saying is not endorsed by all purported Griceans and is commonly rejected on
the basis of speech error data. Philosophers have tried to undermine the principle in
all sorts of other ways as well.1
I believe No saying is true and that showing this is quite important for devel-
oping a viable theory of meaning and communication.2 Griceans quibble about the
proper analysis of speaker meaning but that issue can be set aside here. My argu-
ments are compatible with any of the most plausible theories, all of them analyzing
speaker meaning in terms of some notion of the speaker’s communicative intention.
In what follows, however, I am only concerned with one immediate but controversial
implication of No saying, namely that speakers must always mean what they say.
I begin by explaining why malapropisms are thought to count against Griceanism
as dened by No saying. The most fully worked out argument of this kind is due
to Marga Reimer. She argues that her own ‘conventionalist’ theory of what is said by
malapropisms gives the best explanation of the data. Then I present my rst objec-
tion to conventionalism; the argument from underspecication. In the next section,
I present my own theory, or sketch of a theory, called the ‘misarticulation’ theory
of malapropisms, and show how it is supported by work done on speech errors by
phoneticians. Finally, this makes it possible to state another objection to the con-
ventionalist thesis; the argument from arbitrariness. The major conclusion is that,
contrary to common opinion, the conventionalist cannot use malapropisms to un-
dermine broadly Gricean accounts of what speakers say and mean, based on the No
saying without meaning principle.
2 Malapropism: Saying without meaning?
It is dicult to do justice to the variety of slips and verbal blunders falling under the
heading of ‘malaprop,’ so, to x ideas, I distinguish three kinds. Then I explain how
1See, e.g., Saul (2002, 2007). Elsewhere, I focus on counterexamples to No saying where the
speaker has a conicting referential intention because of false identity beliefs—due to, e.g., Kaplan (1978),
Kripke (1977), Reimer (1992)—but these need to be distinguished from malapropisms (forthcoming).
See also my article ‘Confusion is corruptive belief in false identity’ (2016a). On my view, however, both
should be categorized as a kind of pragmatic performance error. Of course, this would constitute a
substantial revision of the traditional Chomskyan notion of ‘performance.’
2See, e.g., Bach (1987); Donnellan (2012); Neale (2005, pp. 181–182); Strawson (1974, p. 52);
Unnsteinsson (2014, 2016b).
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these examples are thought to give rise to an objection to Griceanism. Consider the
following cases.
1. Incidentalmalaprop: When John Kerry was presidential candidate for Democrats
in 2004, running against George W. Bush, he slipped while giving a speech and
uttered ‘wasabi’ instead of ‘Wahhabi.’ Kerry clearly intended to refer to a Muslim
fundamentalist sect called ‘Wahhabi’ but, due to fatigue or whatever, the similar-
sounding ‘wasabi’ stumbled through.
2. Persistent malaprop: Reimer (2004) describes a colleague who persistently ut-
tered ‘obtuse’ when he clearly meant that something was abstruse.
3. Intentional malaprop. Davidson (1986) cites an example where the speaker in-
tentionally utters ‘bae of wits’ instead of ‘battle of wits’ for comic eect.
I dene ‘malapropism,’ roughly, as an utterance where some target expression is re-
placed by a dierent expression that is similar in pronunciation. Only unintended
replacements, as in (1) and (2), count as ‘errors.’ Any of these three examples, however,
can then be used to make a plausible argument, along the following lines.
For the rst two types there is some proposition p such that the speaker actu-
ally said and asserted that p, without meaning that p. In the rst example, Kerry said
something about wasabi without meaning anything about wasabi. In the second the
colleague said someone’s writing was obtuse without meaning that anyone’s writing
was obtuse. The third type of case is somewhat more complicated, but here is how
the argument could go. In intentionally uttering a sentence containing the expres-
sion ‘bae’ the speaker said something involving a bae without meaning anything
about a bae, because there is no such thing. The speaker may have meant, however,
something involving a baing battle.
All three examples thus appear to support the idea that, in cases of malapropism,
speakers can say something without actually meaning it. For now, I focus only on the
rst two types, leaving intentional malaprops until the very end. In fact, on Reimer’s
(ibid., 325) conventionalist account, only the rst two types will provide counterex-
amples to No saying, as she believes that the speaker does say and mean the same
thing in the third kind of case.
This leaves us with a question: Why should we accept the description of the rst
two cases as involving saying without meaning? Citing the ‘obtuse’-example, Reimer
(ibid., 322) writes that “[t]he speaker of a malaprop, upon being informed of the fact
that his use was non-standard, would likely agree that what he actually said was
dierent from what he intended to say.” A few sentences later, she gives a fairly direct
answer to my question.
Malapropism: Saying without meaning? 4
[I]f we are going to develop a philosophically sound notion of saying, it
would presumably be best to build it upon a pre-theoretical notion that is
sensitive to a distinction that has clear explanatory value: the distinction
between saying and (speaker) meaning. This is a distinction that allows us
to explain (inter alia) the coherence of claiming that one doesn’t always
mean what one says.
According to Reimer, then, we should posit a distinction between saying and meaning
to explain why it is coherent for speakers to describe malapropisms in terms of the
distinction.3 But how is what is said determined, then, if not by way of communicative
intentions? On Reimer’s view, it is determined by linguistic convention; in making the
malaprop the speaker simply says and asserts what the words ‘conventionally mean’
in the language in question. Without assuming a full-blown theory of conventionality,
Reimer takes this to imply, at a minimum, that by engaging in the rule governed activity
of speaking English, the speaker tacitly agrees to have their utterances interpreted in
accordance with the conventions of the language. As they say, speaking a language is
like playing a game. It follows, then, that Reimer’s colleague asserted that someone’s
writing was obtuse while meaning that it was abstruse.
More specically, Reimer—and those who share her general outlook4—speaks of
‘contextually relativized conventional meaning’ in order to “accommodate indexicality
and ambiguity” (ibid., 333n2). Assuming that this is clear enough let us state the
Reimerian thesis as follows:
Conventionalist theory of malapropisms
When speaker S utters malaprop-sentence µ, the content of what S says is de-
termined by the contextually relativized conventional meaning of µ, which is,
say, the proposition that p.
Additionally, S may mean and implicate all sorts of things other than what S strictly
says by uttering µ. Further, at least when dealing with unintended malaprops, that p is
no part of what S means or intends. A malaprop-sentence is any sentence containing
an expression that ‘replaced’—in a sense to be made precise below—another similar-
sounding expression in the speaker’s utterance.
3Michael Devitt (2013: 88) also describes speech errors, spoonerisms in particular, as cases of
unintentionally saying one thing and meaning another.
4Searle (1969: ch. 2) is a classic statement of this type of conventionalism.
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3 The argument from underspecication
Now I will argue that the conventionalist fails to correctly describe the cases at hand
because the conventionally encoded meaning of a linguistic expression—even if rela-
tivized to context—always underspecies what is said by the speaker in uttering that
expression on a given occasion. This idea is not new and was spelled out in some
detail by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson in Relevance (1986/1995) and other work.5
Gricean theorists propose to bridge this gap with communicative intentions, so that
successful communication is always explained by means of the hearer’s capacities for
intention-recognition and mindreading.6
In light of this tradition in philosophy of language, let’s take a closer look at so-
called ‘incidental’ malaprops. Assume Kerry uttered,
(1) Wasabi is a dangerous sect,
but his plan was to utter,
(2) Wahhabi is a dangerous sect.
Now, what exactly, according to the conventionalist, did Kerry say by uttering (1)?
What is the contextually relativized conventional meaning of (1)? The simple disquo-
tational answer would be that Kerry said (3).
(3) that wasabi is a dangerous sect.
But this is far from clear. ‘Wasabi’ is clearly polysemous or ambiguous.7 It can refer to
(i) a condiment popular on sushi, or (ii) a plant of the Brassicacae family, from which
the condiment is produced. The conventionalist has three options, it seems: either
Kerry said something about (i), or (ii), or (iii) the meaning is somehow indeterminate
between the two. But all three options are problematic.
5Cf. Wilson & Sperber (2012). I argue for this view of underspecication in my (2014), but related
ideas are to be found in, e.g., Bach (1994a, 1994b); Bezuidenhout (2002); Carston (2002); Neale (2016);
Perry (1986, 2012); Recanati (2010); Reimer (2002); Searle (1978); Travis (1989, 1997); Weiskopf (2007);
Wettstein (1984).
6To be clear, the notion of what is said at play in No saying is a notion that incorporates illocu-
tionary force. This is as it should be, as competent hearers must recognize this part of the speaker’s
intention if communication is to succeed. Dierent theorists have of course proposed dierent ways of
cutting the saying-pie. For example, Bach (1994a) denes a notion of a proposition type relativized to
narrow context, which explicitly excludes creatures of illocution. This stipulated notion is not at issue
in this paper.
7The dierence between polysemy and ambiguity seems to be mostly a matter of degree. See
Sennet (2011) for discussion.
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Assume rst, and quite plausibly, that in the past Kerry has usually uttered ‘wasabi’
to mean (i) and is only vaguely aware that ‘wasabi’ is also the name of the plant. Let’s
now go through the options one by one. First, is it possible that Kerry said something
about the condiment by uttering (1)? It’s glaringly obvious that relativizing to context
doesn’t support this answer. Ex hypothesi, there is nothing at all in the immediate
context to determine (i) as opposed to (ii). The utterance is made in the context of a
speech that has nothing to do with any plant or condiment.
What if the contextual salience of (i) is increased by supposing, e.g., that Kerry
actually said that he didn’t like the taste of wasabi right before he uttered (1), making
the same error? (Inventing a plausible context is surely possible here.) This would still
not suce to determine which meaning is at issue. Polysemous expressions can quite
easily be intended in dierent ways in one and the same context. So the following
conversation—where the speakers refer successively to the condiment and the plant—
shouldn’t raise any eyebrows.
(4) Wasabi is so expensive.
(5) Yeah, wasabi is very hard to cultivate.
Someone might stop me here and say, “You’re already assuming thatwasabi-as-condiment
is much more salient in Kerry’s mind and in the context of utterance. So, arguably, only
this meaning would play a role in any causal explanation of Kerry’s malaprop. If so,
wouldn’t this suce to determine the contextually relativized conventional meaning
of ‘wasabi’ in (1)?” Sounds plausible to me, but note, however, that taking this line is
not open to the conventionalist.8 Conventionalism, at least as understood by Reimer,
is predicated on minimizing the role of what the speaker ‘has in mind’ in determining
contents. Remember that, on Reimer’s account, and language users tacitly agree to
have their words interpreted in accordance with prevailing conventions, relative to
context. And letting the speaker’s intention override convention here doesn’t leave
much over for convention, explanatorily speaking (more on this in §5 below).
The same set of considerations counts against option (ii) and more strongly so, as
it’s the less salient of the two meanings. What about (iii)? Is the conventional meaning
of the malaprop indeterminate between, at least, (i) and (ii)? Whatever we say about
the case at hand, this cannot be the conventionalist’s answer in general. Consider
a slightly starker example, involving homonymy or ambiguity, where the speaker
planned to utter ‘Take those dead bats to the tank’ but, in the psycholinguistics jargon,
performs the speech error of ‘perseveration’ and utters (6) instead.
(6) Take those dead bats to the bank.
8To be clear, although this is plausible, it is not what I propose below on behalf of the intentionalist.
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Perseveration is when an earlier segment of speech replaces a later item, so, here,
/b/ replaces /t/ (cf. Carroll 2007: ch. 8; Fromkin 1973; Levelt 1993: ch. 9).9 Now, if
conventional meaning always underspecies the meaning intended by the speaker,
the sound sequence /bank/ is quite clearly ambiguous and can be intended, by normal
speakers on dierent occasions, as referring to a nancial institution or a riverbank. As
before, the context is assumed to have nothing to do with either conventional meaning,
so it can’t help the conventionalist. But if option (iii) is endorsed, the theory predicts
that what is said by the speaker who slips and utters (6) is indeterminate between the
two meanings. This consequence, when generalized, should be unacceptable to the
conventionalist. Why? Because, for a lot of cases, the theory would be left with no
single, sensible answer to the question: What is said by the speaker of the malaprop-
sentence?
This bears elaboration, since conventionalists could simply be happy with the
prediction. It may even seem plausible to suppose that, in mistakenly uttering (6), the
speaker in fact said something which is indeterminate between the two alleged senses
of ‘bank.’ Or, if there are two homonyms at play here, it is indeterminate whichword the
speaker uttered. But this will not do. Reimer explicitly seeks a notion of saying where
what is said is determined by an interpretation which accords with prevailing linguistic
convention. And it is clear that, in ordinary contexts, an utterance of ‘bank’ ought
to be interpreted as indicating one and only one of the two senses. Overriding this
apparent convention requires something very specic, even metalinguistic; something
along the lines of: “There are river banks and nancial banks. I’m going to the bank. I
don’t care which type of bank it is.” In uttering the second sentence, the speaker may
have pulled of the feat of to saying something which is indeterminate between the
two senses of ‘bank.’
Arguably, however, slips like (6) involve contexts that are not quite ordinary, either.
The conventionalist may wish to assert that, in such cases, what the speaker says
is determined only by linguistically encoded conventional meaning, no matter how
indeterminate. The problem, however, is that this cuts the saying-pie in two very
dierent halves, breaking its unity. Remember that I am assuming that conventional
linguistic meaning underspecies what is said. On this view, the conventional meaning
of a sentence is a constraint on what a speaker can say and mean on a given occasion of
utterance. And, arguably, the constraint is not fully propositional, but what the speaker
says and means, on this picture, is a proposition with a truth condition. But then, if the
conventionalist analysis of (1) and (6) is accepted, the malaprop-part of the pie will not
9Because of the idiomatic expression ‘can take it to the bank’—meaning, roughly, that someone can
depend on the truth of what one says—the slip in (6) might also be explained as a case of ‘substitution,’
where part of the sentence uttered is inltrated by some unrelated expression.
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actually contain any of the things speakers ordinarily say, i.e. truth-apt propositional
contents. This undermines the conventionalist description of malapropisms and, thus,
the accompanying argument against Gricean intentionalism. Seen in the right light,
conventionalism fails to show that Kerry said anything about wasabi; he only uttered
a sentence which, under other circumstances, could have been used to say something
about wasabi. To be sure, the conventionalist can respond by arguing that the thesis of
underspecication is false. Although I believe this is a dead end, that debate is beyond
the scope of the paper.
The bottom line, then, can be stated as follows. If we want the notion of saying to
apply to cases of malapropism at all, we ought to prefer theories according to which
speakers, in misspeaking, can determinately say something.10 The theory I sketch in
the next section is one such theory and, so, would seem preferable to a view where
what is said must be unusually indeterminate. The problem, of course, is that the con-
ventionalists lack a trick that the intentionalists have up their sleeve. As mentioned
above, on the intentionalist view, sentence-meanings place constraints on the forma-
tion of communicative intentions. But what is said by the speaker on an occasion is
constituted only by the communicative intention, although the intention needs to be
compatible with the meaning of the expression the speaker planned to utter. With
this background one can always fall back on saying, even when the speaker is being
indeterminate or engaging in double entendre of some sort, that the speaker’s intention
constitutively determines which meaning is at issue. On the conventionalist picture,
the ‘language’ must always determine this for us—in a sense which seems dicult to
make precise. True, this means the intentionalist is saddled with the counterintuitive
thesis that there is no saying without meaning. If the arguments in this paper are
on the right track, however, this is much less of a problem than many theorists have
tended to suppose.
4 The misarticulation theory of malapropisms
Now I present what the Gricean theorist, in a more positive way, should say about
malapropism. The idea is basically to use the model ofmispronunciation on all varieties
of speech error. This results in a parsimonious and elegant theory that is compatible
10It is worth noting that both the conventionalist and the intentionalist could adopt the view that
nothing is actually said in cases of malapropism; there is only what the speaker meant. I discuss this
option briey from the intentionalist standpoint below. But the issue is partly terminological, i.e., the
debate would tend to shift to a notion like the ‘primary’ or ‘semantic’ meaning of the utterance. Anyway,
the reader is welcome to conditionalize the whole argument of this paper: if malapropism involves
saying, this is how the notion ought to be explicated.
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with the full range of ‘speech errors’ revealed both by experimental work and empirical
observation.
Misarticulation theory of malapropisms
When speaker S utters malaprop-sentence µ, the content of what S says is deter-
mined by S’s communicative intention in uttering µ, for example that p. This is
so even if µ happens to be standardly uttered, in S’s language, to say something
other than p.
It is important to note that, on any Gricean theory, the formation of communicative
intentions is severely constrained by the speaker’s other mental states, specically,
speakers cannot intend to do what they believe is impossible (see, e.g., Donnellan
1968). I should also add that, so far, this is only a theory of unintentional malaprops,
that is to say, cases where uttering µ constitutes an error from the point of view of the
speaker, since some other expression was the intended target. So, on this theory, even
if it is normal, in S’s language, to utter µ with some dierent communicative intention,
which ‘ts’ the conventional meaning of µ better, it doesn’t follow that that’s what µ
says on a given occasion. Further, when S misspeaks there is always some expression
σ in S’s language such that S misarticulated σ as µ and the proposition expressed by
S in uttering µ need only be compatible with the abstract linguistic meaning of σ,
on the occasion of utterance. Indeed, σ is the target of the speaker’s intention and,
on this view, the communicative intention need only be compatible with the target
expression, not the erroneous expression. One clear advantage of this theory is that
it captures the full range of speech errors, also those made by, for example, people
learning a second language. Native speakers of Icelandic, when learning English, tend
to confuse /v/ and /w/ in speech articulation. So my wife sometimes says she is in
‘Vest Willage’ rather than West Village. Hearers have no problem compensating and
can easily understand what is being said.
More generally, empirical work on speech perception reveals what linguists call
the ‘lack of invariance problem,’ namely that there is no one-to-one correspondence
between acoustic signals and perceptual categorization into phonetic segments. In
speech perception, very dierent acoustic patterns appear, to the hearer, as just a sin-
gle sound. The reason for this is the phenomenon of coarticulation. Phonetic segments
are coarticulated in that the acoustics of a single segment of speech is inuenced by
the preceding or following sounds in the utterance. Take, for example, the produc-
tion of the /t/ segments in ‘toe’ and ‘tea.’ Here, the lips are positioned dierently in
anticipation of the articulation of the vowel sounds that follow, resulting in slightly
dierent acoustic signals. This gave rise to the counterintuitive idea that we actually
recognize phonetic segments by perceiving their mode of articulation by the speaker,
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rather than their acoustics, since this appears to provide a more robust categorization
(see Hickok 2014, ch. 5, for critical discussion). At the very least, however, lack of
invariance shows that speech perception involves all sorts of automatic mechanisms
compensating for context-induced variation in acoustic cues. Various dierences in
the signal simply go unnoticed by speakers and hearers. Arguably, philosophers have
tended to overlook speech errors where such compensation is automatically or uncon-
sciously performed by the hearer and, thus, their perspective has been skewed towards
cases where speakers appear to say something other than they intended because of
the error.
Furthermore, experimental work on misspeaking shows a tendency for speech
errors to produce words rather than non-word strings. This is called the lexical bias
eect. So, for example, if a speaker is already familiar with the name ‘Aubrey,’ speech
errors involving the similar sounding ‘Audrey’ should tend towards replacing /d/ with
/b/, rather than, say, /t/ or /k/. Speech errors are anchored in the language actually
spoken, making it less likely that the non-name ‘Aukrey’ is produced when the target
is ‘Audrey’ (see Levelt 1993: §9.5.2, for discussion).11,12 Examples like this will be
important for what follows. And my claim, here, is that malapropism should be seen
in light of phonetic and articulatory variance across individuals more generally.
So, to keep to the same example, the native speaker of Icelandic might utter, when
arriving at a dinner party,
(7) I brought the vine,
and thereby mean that she brought the wine.13 But the suggestion on the table is that,
for the purposes of semantics, this utterance of (7) should not, merely because ‘vine’
happens to be a word in English, be considered any dierent from misarticulations
11Lexical bias normally interacts with other eects, for example the phonemic similarity eect,
according to which phonemes that have similar articulatory proles are more likely to interact in
speech. Thus, since /d/ and /t/ are both dental stop consonants, but /k/ is velar (articulated with the
back of the tongue at the soft palate and not at the upper teeth), ‘Autrey’ is probably more likely to
occur than ‘Aukrey.’ Interestingly, the phonemic similarity eect is absent in ‘inner speech,’ but lexical
bias is present (Oppenheim & Dell 2008).
12When she was two, my daughter could only pronounce the name ‘Oliver’ as ‘olive oil’—the English
is very similar to the Icelandic—which, I presume, was partly explained by lexical bias since she learned
the latter rst. I could give a very long list of such examples.
13Karen Green (2001: 242) also gives a good example of a persistent malapropism that ts this theory
well. In a school project, her young son wrote, “Hitler was the leader of the nasty party.” In this case
the speaker misarticulates ‘Nazi’ as ‘nasty.’ Admittedly, the case is more complex, since he may also
have had the (true) belief that Hitler was the leader of the nasty party. But if this is a malaprop at all,
and not just a plain expression of this true belief, we must also assume that /nasty/ is his erroneous
way of articulating ‘Nazi.’
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resulting in non-word strings. The misarticulation theory claims that the speaker of
(7) happened, on this occasion, to pronounce ‘wine’ as ‘vine.’ Here, and, it would seem,
for the vast majority of misspeakings, this description is perfectly ne. But it should
be expanded to capture the less intuitive cases as well, paying handsome dividends
in terms of simplifying the overall theory.
Admittedly, cases of this sort are intuitively understood in terms of simple dier-
ences in idiolect. Any ‘public language’ is just what a bunch of idiolects share and
these vary in all sorts of ways. This does not, however, speak against the present point.
In so far as a speaker who utters (7) had /wine/ as their target sound sequence on a
given occasion, they perform a speech error. So, on this picture, some mistakes made
by non-native speakers can be classied as malapropisms. Of course there will be cases
where we can only describe speakers as having an idiolectical /vine/ sequence as tar-
get. But think of cases where the speaker is being ‘corrected’ by native speakers and
doesn’t get it right until after a few attempts: here there is clearly a target-error pair.
There is a continuum of cases going from idiolectical variation, through persistent
malaprops, until we get to the one-o, incidental cases.
Slips of the tongue where one proper name replaces another are perhaps the least
intuitive cases for the misarticulation theory. For it predicts that a speaker might
pronounce, e.g., ‘Frank’ as ‘Joanne,’ which seems absurd. But let’s start with a real-life
example and take it from there. When Osama Bin Laden was killed numerous media
outlets reported something like (8).
(8) Obama was killed.
It was clear that they were making a mistake. But even if many couldn’t resist giving
the Freudian explanation that (8) manifested the speaker’s repressed desire, phonetic
considerations are much more powerful.14 In this case the target expression, ‘Osama,’
shares a lot of features with the error expression, including stress-pattern and syllable
number. Importantly, this is true of the majority of actual target-error pairs. The names
also share many general semantic features, e.g. they are both names of powerful men
who are often in the news. Further, there may even be a phonetic anticipation eect
hiding here since ‘Osama’ can easily activate the expression ‘Bin Laden’ and this could
make the activated /b/ segment replace the earlier /s/ segment.15 So, the speaker of
14I do not mean to suggest that phonology and psychoanalysis are engaged in the same explana-
tory projects here. However, a good phonological explanation will often make a psychoanalytic one
superuous. And this is exactly what Rudolf Meringer, who was the rst to investigate slips seriously
from a phonological point of view, argued as against Freud in the early 20th century (Erard 2008 ch. 2).
15‘Anticipation’ is the opposite of perseveration, where a later segment replaces an earlier one, e.g.
‘bake my bike’ replaces ‘take my bike’ (Carroll 2007: 195). Michael Erard (2008: 264–267) discusses the
Obama/Osama example in a book popularizing phonetic explanations of malapropisms.
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(8) simply pronounced ‘Osama’ as ‘Obama.’ Certainly there will be slips where the
phonetic explanation is not as obvious, but according to the empirical literature these
are much less common and, arguably, they should not dictate theoretical choices. Our
theory should generalize from the most common type of case, i.e. ones where the
explanation is phonetic, and treat the strained cases as anomalies. This clearly applies
to examples like the one where a speaker intends to utter ‘Frank’ but utters ‘Joanne’
instead.
A reviewer for this journal aptly points out that I have ignored Grice’s own analysis
of some types of non-literal speech. And this deserves a brief comment. Grice proposed
that, to take his own example, when a speaker utters ‘He is a ne friend’ and means it
ironically, they only pretend or make as if to say that someone is a ne friend. In fact
the speaker says nothing but, by way of an act of pretence, they mean that someone is
a terrible friend (or something along those lines). I would tend to endorse this proposal
for certain kinds of gurative speech—including irony. However, the model does not
t malapropisms. Pretending to say that p in order to convey that q requires a complex
set of intentions which is entirely absent in malapropism. As the case is described
here, the reporter who utters (8) has no intention to pretend to say that Obama was
killed, they just utter (8) inadvertently while intending to utter something that sounds
very similar. Thus, I don’t want to argue that Grice’s notion of making as if to say is
illuminating for analyzing speech errors.16
5 Argument from arbitrariness
Accepting level-headed, phonetic explanations gives the upper hand to the misarticula-
tion theory since the semantics of malaprop-expressions usually gure only minimally
in the best explanations of their occurrence. If the speaker had uttered ‘Ofama’ instead
of ‘Obama’ no one—and that includes the conventionalist—would have thought that
they had unintentionally said anything about anyone. But since the speaker could
have uttered (8) in the same context intending to refer to Obama we tend to think of
the case dierently. Wrongly so.
Remember also our conclusion from the Wahhabi/wasabi example. If the conven-
tional meaning of ‘Obama’ underspecies its intended reference on a given occasion
of utterance, which must be right I think, there is nothing to x or determine which
Obama is referred to in (8). According to the Gricean, only referential intentions can
16Note, however, that this kind of proposal would be untouched by the argument from underspeci-
cation. When speakers make as if to say something by uttering a sentence containing an ambiguous
term like ‘bank,’ they would, normally, either make as if to say something about a nancial institution
or about a river bank.
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perform this task but, ex hypothesi, the speaker had no intention to refer to anyone
called Obama in uttering (8). Thus the conventionalist must collapse the referential
content of ‘Obama’ in (8) with its descriptive content, which is, presumably, some-
thing like the person called ‘Obama.’ Admittedly, in this particular case, one referent is
extremely salient, but still, there is nothing in the conventionalist story to determine
whether (8) is about the 44th US President or, say, Barack Obama Sr., his father.
To be clear, however, the issue is not decided conclusively by discovering the right
causally explanatory theory of malaprops. Conventionalism is strictly speaking com-
patible with any such theory since it’s only a claim about the meaning or content
of malaprops in context. But empirical ndings yield grounds on which to build the
decisive argument, which is an argument from arbitrariness: the conventionalist the-
ory makes an entirely arbitrary distinction between word and non-word producing
errors. The rst kind, it is thought, says something but the latter says nothing since the
resulting string has no conventional meaning at all. Clearly, this content error/empty
error distinction crosscuts any distinction made by a plausible explanatory theory.
On anyone’s account there will be some content errors that are explained in exactly
the same way as any kind of empty error, namely by way of phonetic/phonological
eects. Content errors are common because of the lexical bias eect. But this eect
is mostly due to formal similarities in target-error pairs, such as morphological and
syntactic distribution, stress-patterns, and the like. If the conventional meaning of
the error expression does not play a role in explaining its occurrence, it is hard to see
why it ought to be postulated as the content expressed by the speaker in uttering the
malaprop-sentence on a given occasion. As before, this undermines the convention-
alist’s description of malapropisms in §2 above and makes it doubtful that we have a
real counterexample to a broadly Gricean theory.17
Still, it might be claimed—this was indeed suggested to me by Michael Devitt (pers.
comm.)—that in those cases where semantic features play a substantial role in the cor-
rect causal explanation of a malaprop the corresponding meaning could be attributed
to the speaker.18 I think this is ne as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go very far. First,
17Note, also, that the two views under discussion in this paper are not intended to be exhaustive
of theoretical space. So, I don’t try to conclusively establish the truth of the misarticulation theory
here. One could, for example, prefer Gauker’s (2003, 2008) non-intentional theory or King’s (2014,
2013) ‘coordination account’ of the matter. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal who
emphasized this point.)
18See also Devitt (1981: 139–140), where he writes: “[. . . ] more than one ability, and hence more
than one network, may have an immediate role in the production of a designational term. When this
happens, we have slips of mind or tongue, cases of “crossed wires.” A classical example of such an
occurrence was supplied, appropriately enough, by Canon Spooner. He once delivered a sermon that
included many uses of ‘Aristotle.’ He was leaving the pulpit when suddenly he stopped, returned, and
announced to the congregation, “When in my sermon I said ‘Aristotle’ I meant St. Paul.” We are inclined
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as already noted, Reimer’s conventionalism doesn’t allow for this type of response.
Secondly, and more to the present point, what causes the utterance of an expression
cannot in general be identied with what is meant or said by that expression. Ob-
viously phonetic features are not assigned as the contents of what a speaker says
because they causally explain the fact that the utterance was produced on a particular
occasion. Only the communicative intention of the speaker can constitutively x or
determine what is said and meant on a given occasion of utterance.
Thirdly, and nally, even if the causal-conventionalist thesis were accepted it would
leave out a host of cases where speakers indeed uttered a malaprop which happened
to be syntactically well-formed, but where the correct explanation is entirely or partly
phonetic/phonological. Thus the objection from arbitrary distinctions crops up again:
Why suppose that some syntactically well-formed errors are assigned contents and
others are not? On the misarticulation theory, the only relevant possible world in
which Kerry says (3) by uttering (1) is one where he—perhaps for one strange moment
in a speech—actually believes that wasabi is a dangerous sect. In such a case, of course,
the intentionalist assigns this very content to the speaker on the occasion of utterance.
But any real-world explanation of a malaprop will be a messy aair of intermingled
syntactic and phonetic features, where it would be entirely arbitrary to assign (3)
to some (1)-malaprop-utterances on some occasions and not to others. Better to say
Kerry mispronounced ‘Wahhabi’ as ‘wasabi’ and be done with it.
So far, nothing has been said about intentional malaprops like the one mentioned
by Davidson (1986: 89) where the speaker utters ‘bae of wits’ instead of ‘battle
of wits.’ This is as it should be, because it is much harder to construct a plausible
counterexample to intentionalism using only intentional malapropisms. And they are
malaprops in name only for the speaker doesn’t make any mistake at all; they use an
expression the utterance of whichwould constitute a mistake in some dierent context,
e.g., a context where the speaker falsely believes that ‘battle’ should be pronounced
/bae/. But intentional malapropisms are interesting in their own right and serve
well, at this juncture, to clarify the less obvious dierences between conventionalism
and the misarticulation theory. On Reimer’s account (9) gets assigned its contextually
relativized conventional meaning, namely that a bae of wits ensued.
(9) A bae of wits ensued.
So ‘bae’ means bae and ‘wits’ wits. Certainly, Reimer adds, the speaker also com-
municates, by association, that what happened was a battle of wits and that it was in
some way cause for baement.
to say that Spooner had St. Paul in mind but ended up referring to Aristotle.” Indeed we are so inclined.
But the inclination ought to be resisted in this case. On my view Spooner, for some reason, and over
some specic stretch of time, mispronounced ‘St. Paul’ as ‘Aristotle.’
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The point to make here is that the intentionalist is free to concur, and postulate that
the speaker’s communicative intention in uttering (9) may very well be that a bae
of wits ensued. It’s just that this happens also to be its conventional meaning, accord-
ing to Reimer. And this is, on both accounts, what is said by the speaker. The subtle
disagreement would occur only at the level of content determination. The convention-
alist assigns this meaning because it is the conventional meaning. The intentionalist
does so because it is the meaning intended by the speaker. This kind of case is so very
special, it seems to me, that it cannot be used to adjudicate between the two theories.
6 Conclusion
Famously, J. L. Austin (1957: 133n1) made a distinction between doing something by
mistake and doing something by accident. I don’t think his own formulation was a
very helpful one, nor do I think he gave a good argument for accepting it—but those
were, of course, the heady days of ordinary language. At any rate, he may have had
something like the following in mind. When you mistake one thing for another thing
you might do something wrong by mistake. So when you believe falsely that donkey A
is donkey B you might shootAwhile your were actually supposed to shoot B. However,
when you take aim at one thing but miss it and shoot another thing you do something
wrong by accident.
In this sense, malapropisms happen by accident. Speakers have a specic target in
mind but the articulatory mechanism fails them, either persistently or just incidentally.
If the argument in this paper is correct, such accidents are far more common than peo-
ple tend to think. Furthermore, Gricean intention-based theories of communicative
content can account for them without abandoning the idea that what is said is consti-
tutively determined by speaker meaning. It seems plausible to say that malapropisms
provide cases where speakers say something they didn’t intend or mean to say. But
this is an explanation from folk psychology that can easily be restated in terms ac-
ceptable to Griceanism, without loss of explanatory power. When speakers perform
a speech error and produce a syntactically well formed sentence dierent from the
one they intended, they don’t thereby say what that sentence is normally taken to
say. They simply produce a sentence that could have been uttered—if they had had
the requisite communicative intentions—to say what it is normally taken to say.
In terms of the bigger picture, the case for the misarticulation theory of malapropisms
shows the acceptability of idealizing away from pragmatic performance errors when
theorizing about foundational notions in semantics, such as saying, meaning, impli-
cating. I would suggest, further, that this can also be done for the Austinian category
of utterances made ‘by mistake.’ Just as Reimer used malaprops to argue against No
Bibliography 16
saying, many philosophers have used Frege puzzles—and other kinds of confused
identities—for exactly the same purpose. If I’m right, even such cases should be de-
scribed as a special kind of pragmatic error, making the semantic conclusions theorists
are aiming for much less immediate than is usually thought. But that’s a story for
another occasion.
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